

## REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS

### Introduction

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Let us begin with a terminological question: Is the title of our working group correctly formulated at all? Do not the terms "reference" and "fictional text" stand in such opposition that any efforts to reconcile them are necessarily nullified? Certainly I do not hold this opinion: on the contrary, I am convinced that it is perfectly legitimate to speak about reference in fictional texts, but I would not be surprised if, e.g., a literary critic found this formulation strange or even inadmissible. Terminological disagreements are as a rule nothing but the materialisation of conceptual divergencies and as a matter of fact we should take into consideration right from the beginning the fact that there are different conceptions about fictionality and possibility of reference in fictional texts in accordance with the scientific paradigm which one assumes to be right. Our discussion would benefit considerably from the systematization of these special paradigms, this task cannot, however, be accomplished here in an extensive form, as it implies a minute and thorough historical treatment of at least three branches of science which all have a respectable tradition of some thousand years. What I can offer instead is to throw light on some main problems which I consider from the point of view of our present discussion rather decisive in connection with a theory or conception which can be held to be representative of the development of the branch of science or even - if this word can be allowed in this context - to be an archetype.

Several arguments can be advanced in favour of ordering our short overall view so that poetics should be treated first: as everybody knows the first theoretical conceptions about literature were inseparable from the perception of its fictional character. Man became aware of the theoretical problem of fictionality in poetics, and even today fictionality and literature are so closely associated that they are sometimes confused, i.e. it is thought that everything which is literature, is fictional, and everything which is fictional is literature, or the one is taken as a subclass of the other. These views are certainly erroneous as fiction can be used in any field of research and even in everyday communication without any poetic goal or effect. Literature offers nonetheless the most impressive examples of fictional texts and literary theory does not cease from producing newer and newer explanations for this peculiar phenomenon. We would have a veritable *embarras de richesse* if we were to report all the conceptions which have been elaborated in literary study under the heading of fictionality, realism, etc. Instead of that I shall confine my remarks to a classical work which determined the development in this field in a rather elementary way and is - curious as it may sound - in most respects superior to its followers. I mean Aristotle's Poetics, a work which is nowadays seen in quite a different light from some decades ago thanks to the philological research of recent years and to the theoretical investigations of modern poetics although these are based on methods and principles other than those on which Aristotelian Poetics rested, albeit appearing as a true analogon of the Aristotelian *techné*. What I am aiming at in connection with this classical work of theoretical poetics is a rather sacrilegious attempt at translating the main theses and presuppositions of this work concerning fictionality into the metalanguage of modern poetics and at scrutinizing the consequences which follow from them in order to make them

more understandable in a way which does not contradict the original Aristotelian spirit. The main arguments of Aristotelian Poetics as concerns our topic can be summed up as follows:

- 1; There is a class of human activities determined by special features which can be accounted for by general human abilities in imitation, rhythm and melody. This class of activities will be named poetic activities.
- 2; The original manifestations of poetic activities are special forms of oral communication.
- 3; Poetic activity imitates human actions in well structured stories.
- 4; The actions narrated in poetic works represent, according to the nature of poetic activity, possible or necessary actions.
- 5; Poetic activities as a class of human actions are governed by general, partly metaphysical, rules.

These theses need some elucidation and comment however, we can touch here only upon the most important connections.

The first mentioned thesis expresses the assumption that the predicates "poetic", "literature", "poeticity" "literariness", "estheticity" etc. can be applied to a well-defined class of activities or to the results of these activities. Although supported both by the widespread naive conception about literature and by the main schools of modern poetics from the Russian Formalists to Generative Poetics, this assumption seems rather dubious, since neither traditional nor modern poetics have succeeded in setting up a full list of features by means of which the class of poetic phenomena could be unambiguously determined and any such attempt proves necessarily hopeless in an intensive examination. We do not wish to deny that there are human abilities which establish some features recurrent in some or even all poetic activities or texts, but this is only half of the truth, because there are also different abilities which can-

not be explained on the basis of a static anthropological structure. There is a possible solution of this problem if we raise the second thesis out of the rather subordinate position it occupies in Aristotelian Poetics and declare it as central. In this way poetic activity appears as a special form of communication which rests upon convention. It will certainly presuppose some human abilities, but in addition to this it will take into account some other factors as well, e.g. the special interests and goals of the community, whether the convention determining the special poetic activity is commonly accepted, institutionalized or is known only by a minority or even is persecuted, etc. In this view poetic activity and consequently literature have reality only in the context of a historically, sociologically and culturally, determined community disposing of a common convention or conventions and the comprehensive notion of literature or poetic activity can at the very best be conceived of as a family notion, in the sense of the late Wittgenstein, comprising a series of various literary language games. In full agreement with similar statements made by Searle<sup>1</sup> and others I would insist upon the fact that there is no convention embracing all the factual and possible poetic activities, and consequently there being no well definable poetic activity or literature as such, it cannot also be postulated as the starting-point of the theory. Aristotle's approach has for this reason some fundamental difficulties, namely, it is not possible to define the subject of poetics according to his proposal.

Among the distinctive features of poetic activities he mentions first mimesis. This much discussed notion expresses an inborn human ability and at the same time it points to the special semantic significance of such activities or of their results as a rule. As we are here interested in semantic questions this notion deserves some examination. If anybody thinks that "imitation" is too narrow a concep-

tion for literary semantics, he should be reminded that this term should not be taken literally but as a special sort of understanding or knowledge dependent on factual relations - the fact of this dependance will certainly be admitted generally, although its scope will be variously determined. As to the Aristotelian position according to the 3rd thesis we have to take into consideration the fact that mimesis, i.e. the correspondence between events and narration, rests upon the same structure of action in both cases, or, to put it in another way, narration imitates actual events in so far as the structures of real events are mirrored in the fundamental linguistic and narrative settings serving as essential components in narration. Narration itself is labelled "mythos", a word that had the same connotation as the term fiction has nowadays and is defined as follows: "by 'mithos' I mean the arrangement of the events"<sup>2</sup>. This means that at the level of narration there is no question of direct imitation, since narration is considered as constructed or invented according to the requirements of beauty by the poet, this maker of mythos and verses. The question of imitation and of reference can however be raised in a more general connection: If the poet invents a story then it has no referents which could be pointed out as such in the actual world, but it still applies to life as it represents an action structure which is bound to be analogous to a real action structure. Therefore if it proves to be consistent and fulfills all the social and cultural requirements for which Aristotle has the laconic expression beauty, this action will be conceived of as a possible or a necessary action, i.e. something that can or must happen. In this sense narration acquires generality by transcending the linkage to the actual world and to a series of concrete actions which at a primitive stage can be characteristic of certain poetic activities (e.g. iambic poetry) and this transcendence that poetry achieves

according to its very nature means semantically a shift from actual reference to modality. It should be emphasized that Aristotle assumes, just like modern modal logic, that the actual world is a possible state of affairs, therefore he does not see any problem in the embedding of reports of actual events or persons in poetic narration. As he writes "there is nothing to prevent some actual events being the kind that might probably happen, i.e. are capable of happening"<sup>3</sup>.

I cannot at present treat in full the Aristotelian conception about reference and generality in poetic narration. This theme, however, deserves thorough attention, since the sense of the conception outlined before has been profoundly misunderstood in literary theory and the consequences of this misunderstanding exert even today a negative influence on theoretic research in literary study. The basis of this misinterpretation was the inability to comprehend the broad and deep logical foundations of this poetics, the original logical notions having been mutilated and the modality problem taken into parenthesis. Everything had to be valued in accordance with actuality, and this constraint and its frustration gave birth to several peculiar ideas in poetics such a sociological types as referents, the opposition between naive imitation and free creation as archetypal poetic forms of self-expression, the explication of truth in literature by means of a category of particularity that should unify in itself generality and individuality in a dialectical way, etc. I do not wish to maintain that the history of literary theory has been a mere decline since Aristotle's death. The last mentioned thesis points to the fact that his Poetics followed a different scientific paradigm that the one modern scientists profess and I do believe that in methodological respect there is not only a difference, but an effective development, made possible by empirical research and by repressing mere speculation. But speculation has its

merits as well and a real theoretical revival of poetics can only be expected if poetics again acquires the theoretical knowledge it had as a basis in Aristotle's time.

Modern logic was for a long time not very favorable to theoretic research in fiction or generally to literary semantics; this rather negative appreciation can be maintained even if we acknowledge the importance of the aesthetic or poetic conceptions of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and other classics of modern logic. What literary semantics theoretically needs is the formulation of adequate truth conventions for literary texts, I mean the explication of naive intuition by means of which the members of a community may know, what states of affairs prevail in a narrative work belonging to a certain tradition. The truth of literature is an intricate notion, but we certainly need it if we want to make certain statements and inferences about literary texts. In connection with Aristotelian Poetics I have tried to explain that there is no literature and literariness but only concrete literary language games, and consequently there is no truth in literature in general, but according to the convention underlying the special communication forms - an extremely transitional relation determined by pragmatic factors. The claim to formulate truth conditions for fictional texts did not meet with understanding in classical extensional logic, there was even doubt cast on it by the program for the ideal language that should not contain any fictitious terms. Modern logics was interested first of all in truth conditions according to the actual world, therefore a different truth-relation is taken into consideration here than the relation I consider central for literary semantics: in that case we were concerned with the inner semantic constitution of texts according to the underlying convention, here we have to compare the states of affairs presented in the texts with the actual states of affairs; in the first case we try to explicate the understanding of the

text, in the second the stress is laid upon ontological considerations. I do not intend to deny the importance of this ontological question for the theory of fiction, however, I consider it secondary as compared to the semantic one, and the fact that modern logic raised it first contributed mainly to the confusion in the application of logical methods to fictional texts. In principle there are three possible answers to the question of what the truth-value of sentences containing fictional terms is, each of which determines a type of conception in modern logic. The three answers are the following: sentences containing fictional terms are per definitionem true - the Meinongian type, they are per definitionem false - the Russellian type, or they cannot have truth-values - the Frege - Strawson line. These different solutions appear at face value to be equals side by side, but they have rather different prestige and one may wonder if the Meinongian type belongs to modern logic at all as some of its theses contradict classical symbolic logic in such a way that this approach was for a long time totally discredited in modern logic. Due to the essential change that took place recently in logic the Meinongian views are considered much more favorably today, but this does not lessen the difference between the Fregean and the Meinongian ontological presuppositions, i.e. the Meinongian type remains a special class some of the representants of which are to be found among poetic and aesthetic conceptions, e.g. the well known concept of the Tartu-school of the secondary modelling system bears unmistakably Meinongian traits.

The Russellian type was influential for a certain time, but it has not many supporters nowadays, even if certain of its principles are henceforward acknowledged. The main problem of this approach from our point of view is its total insensitivity towards the semantic question of literary works. In his "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" Rus-



sell writes: "... to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in his own world, namely, in the world of Shakespeare's imagination just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is to say something deliberately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. There is only one world, the 'real' world: Shakespeare's imagination is a part of it, and the thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc. in Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet."<sup>4</sup> Russell's argument can be summed up as follows: fictitious names are concealed existential descriptions which do not denote any entity, consequently the sentences containing them must be false, if something were said about fiction or literature in a well-founded way, then this phenomenon had to be translated into a physicalistic or behaviouristic language - a program very impressively solved by Reichenbach in his Elements of Symbolic logic<sup>4a</sup>. Apart from the well-known problems of the description theory this approach implies that there is no inner logical solution for the fundamental semantical problem of fictional texts, this statement is theoretically as unacceptable as the proposed physicalistic reduction.

Beyond dispute the Frege-Strawson line can be considered as the most respected in logic and in certain schools of literary study as well. It is sufficient if we mention that logicians such as Frege, Strawson, Ryle, E.G. Moore and a scholar who began a new period in literary theory, R. Ingarden, are party to this line<sup>5</sup>. In spite of many deep insights into the structure of fictional texts which cannot even be tentatively enumerated here I should like to emphasize that as far as a possible solution of the central question of literary semantics is concerned it does not make

any tangible difference if the sentences containing fictional names are considered false or having no truth value and, in this respect, I agree with Mr. Bernáth's and Mr. Csuri's position concerning Frege's conception about literature.

All these models based on extensional logic belong to the prehistory of the logic of fiction and its formulation is the task of today. As Professor Woods is going to give a systematic overview of the recent discussions it is needless for me to recapitulate the main tendencies, instead of which I wish to point to some questions to which I attach importance. The main problem is to formulate the truth-condition for fictional texts in such a way that these special conditions should not contradict the general truth-conditions, i.e. the validity of these conditions should be limited to the semantic constitution of the relevant communication forms and relatedness of these connections to actuality should be taken into account in quite different terms. Several proposals have been outlined of which I shall mention three. The first is the introduction of a story operator most impressively represented in John Wood's *The Logic of Fiction* which is certainly one of the most important contributions to this question in the last years<sup>7</sup>. I must say, however, that I do not sympathize with this solution because there is no linguistic evidence on which such an operator could be based, the same text could be - as Castañeda has very convincingly pointed out - without the slightest change a fiction and a non-fiction, and if the story operator does not refer to the linguistic structure, but to the fact that the text is being uttered in a special literary communication form, then the story operator reflects a pragmatic feature of the text which cannot be conceived of as generally valid special logic or semantics but as dependant on the convention underlying the text. I presume therefore that Wood's *olim* operator should be reinterpreted in a

pragmatic sense. But this operation can be spared if we follow Routley's proposition to base the logic of fiction on context logic. The main thesis of his approach, that "there is no general uniform logic of fiction ... each work will have its own internal logic"<sup>8</sup> corresponds to the ideas I am trying to explain here. I certainly consider Routley's approach as a whole very promising, even if context logic itself is contested by some logicians. The third solution is the application of the central notion of modal logic "possible world" to fictional texts. It has the advantage that by means of the model theoretic apparatus a lot of problems can be technically solved unambiguously. The main question is, however, whether fiction can be considered at all as a possible world in the sense of intensional logic. Certainly we have no longer a comprehensive notion of fiction and an argument pointing out that there are narrative worlds representing logically impossible connections does not disturb us. We do know about conventions of building up nonsensical texts, but their existence is not a proof against the applicability of this notion to any fictional texts whatsoever. I mean there are classes of texts to which this notion can be applied, but not without certain essential changes. In this respect Mr. Bernath and Mr. Csuri will present an interesting experiment, whereas I should like to emphasize that the truth-conditions determined by pragmatical conventions can only be stated empirically in connection with the community making use of the relevant communication form. In this respect I should like to touch upon one of the most discussed questions of the logic of fiction, namely what kind of entities are referred to in fictional texts. Professor Pavel's study and Professor Pelc's paper are devoted to this topic. I should like, however, to formulate briefly a somewhat different position. The majority of the theoreticians of literature and even a great number of logicians are inclined to take fictional characters such as Hamlet, Anna

Karenina, Sherlock Holmes, etc. for non-actual but well-individuated objects, a view supported either by pure analogies or by Meinongian ontology or by the fallacy that the possible world-semantics commits one to choose the possible constants and to give them extensional interpretations, etc. I do not wish to accept this rather doubtful ontology and I think the analyst having in view such well-known fictional characters is considerably misled, if he tries to determine the properties of fictional characters according to these most representative figures. Whoever has analysed folktales - a genre in which fiction appears in all likelihood historically for the first time - knows that there is no need for names, a singular indefinite description ("an old man") or a definite description ("the king") do the same. For convenience one can - as Aristotle mentioned - "tack on names afterward"<sup>9</sup>, but by this dubbing nothing has ontologically changed, there is no new entity coming into being, the name not being any more than a textual device of crossreference. As to the fictional character itself, it should not be conceived of as a constant but rather a variable which is at the same time determined by a number of properties prescribed by the game that involves it. If I say, let us imagine a game of chess, White applying strategy A, Black adopting strategy B, then White and Black are not two entities, but two roles of players defined by the game, logically explicated as two variables having the corresponding predicates in the scope of existential quantifiers. This is too simple an example to overcome all the difficulties in the semantics of fiction, nevertheless it points to what my deep conviction is: if there is a solution to this discussion, it is not to be found in ontological speculations but in empirical investigations revealing the inner structure of fictional narratives.

As far as linguistics is concerned I was compelled in the course of my explanation to take sides in one of the main linguistic discussions going on between defenders of an abstract language system of a Saussurian type and the partisans of a primarily conventionally determined language concept. For the sake of order I should like to make it clear that I belong to the last mentioned group, i.e. I consider that theoretical problems of literature, fiction and even reference can only be satisfactorily solved if we consider the use of the texts as basic. Only in so far as the contextual background is systematically taken into account can the problem of deictic particles, articles, pronouns - so differently treated in different grammatics, but in its importance generally underestimated - be settled in an adequate way. Nowadays there are two main approaches to this problem, the one I would label the extension of logic to natural language the other the recurrence of self-determining linguistic principles. Let us begin with the last one. This conception could hardly be illustrated better than by the following extracts of Mr. Bierwisch's classical, and anything but outdated, study "On classifying Semantic Features": "... an interpretation of reference indices and corresponding arguments along the lines (of usual logical analysis - Z.K.) must be given up. Instead of this I propose to consider an argument  $X_1$  as a variable to be substituted by the representation of a fraction of the (real or fictitious) universe talked about. This fraction is made up from one or more equivalent objects or individuals which are singled out for separate predication only under specific conditions. These conditions are either part of the predicate to be applied or expressed by particular specifiers and quantifiers such as 'every', 'all', 'two', 'many', etc. ... I suspect however that the proposed concept of 'global reference' cannot be explained in terms of more basic notions of a semantic theory, but must be taken as a primitive no-

tion itself. I presume, in other words that in this respect the quantification theory and the linguistic semantic theory are radically different in that they take opposing directions: whereas quantification theory takes individuals as the starting point from which exhaustive and partial sets are constructed by means of universal and existential quantification, linguistic semantics probably has to start with sets as primitive terms which may further be specified with respect to the participation to their elements in particular states of affairs"<sup>10</sup>. Though Mr. Bierwisch is one of the linguists from whom I personally have learned the most, I cannot follow him in this respect. More exactly I agree with him in the details, not however in the conclusions he seems to be compelled to draw. Since I have not enough time to propound my opinion let me formulate the hypothesis underlying my studies in this direction to the effect that logical and linguistic relations should not be opposed to each other and that logical relations reflect as a rule the abstract correspondences in the structure of natural language. However, in order to get an adequate picture of this last we need to take into account over and above the logical connections the features of the context the text is embedded in, as the consideration of context-relations may considerably transform the logical pattern. This principle was by the way very convincingly adapted by E. Lang, who unfortunately could not accept our invitation to participate in our discussion, in his excellent text-theoretic book "Semantik der koordinativen Verknüpfung"<sup>11</sup>. According to this principle my starting-point would not be a primitive notion "global reference" presupposing sets as primitive terms, but the usual distinctions by means of the appertinence of individuals to sets and of quantification. In accordance with the proposals of Bellert, van Dijk and others, certain features of the reference indices should be connected with the referential or the pragmatic context, classes of reference indices seem

to be specialised in order to indicate a certain type of determination of the objects they refer to. It is not possible and not even necessary to explain the theoretical basis of this conception, as I have done it elsewhere<sup>12</sup>.

What I have to do for illustrations's sake is to show that it is possible to give a consistent explication of the examples that led Mr. Bierwisch to the contested conclusions within the scope of the proposed theory. Mr. Bierwisch's examples refer to the use of the definite article "the" determining nouns in plural such as

- 1; The boys hit the girls.
- 2; The policemen rounded up the demonstration.
- 3; The whites oppress the negroes.
- 4; The Chinese of the seventh century knew porcelain.

The definite article is as a matter of fact a homonymic morphological unit for at least the following three different types of reference:

- 1; the generic one corresponding to the universal quantifier,
- 2; the referential one defining the speaker's reference to an object or a set of objects,
- 3; the existential one corresponding to the existential quantifier, this use being determined by syntactic constructions and the semantic features of the nouns and the verbs taking part in them.

Although Mr. Bierwisch's examples can certainly be differently interpreted, the problem Mr. Bierwisch pointed to is obviously joined to the referential use. Mr. Bierwisch is certainly right in pointing out that it is impossible to give a correct account of our first example by means of quantificational logic, since a quantification based on sets consisting of individuals compels us to take sides, viz. if every boy hit every girl or some boys hit some girls, etc. All possible variants do not seem to correspond with the original sentence. He is also right when in connection with

the third example he states: "Rather the groups referred to are understood as a plurality whose individuals are not singled out with respect to participation or nonparticipation in the states and processes in question. It is claimed only that the group as a whole is concerned"<sup>13</sup>. This however is not the consequence of the indeterminacy of reference in natural language, but is a rather normal effect of plurality. The definite article with a singular noun in its scope introduces an individual, that with a plural noun, however, a set the power of which is greater than one. By the use of the definite article and plural in general the speaker is not committed to anything more than the fact there is a set consisting of more than one element to which the speaker intends to refer. If he wishes to be more explicit, he has several numerical quantifiers at his disposal and he can very well explain how many individuals are concerned, since natural language has this possibility as well and it seems not at all a subordinated special case. In a word, it seems to me to be possible to preserve the essential insights of Mr. Bierwisch's analysis without being compelled to give up the inclusion of logical and set-theoretical relations in linguistics.

A last remark about narrative research: after the decline of the structuralistic approaches of the sixties the interest in empirical research - I do not mean interpretation - has perceptibly diminished. Dr. Rauh's paper resuming the main results of her doctoral dissertation makes an exception that we are very glad to include in our program. The general scene is, however, not very reassuring: on the one hand theoretic experiments amounting to the mere application of theories originally devoted to the explication of quite different connections, on the other hand empirical research and interpretations with insufficient theoretical foundations while the decisive questions, e.g. the question of a narrative syntax, are not even raised. Though the pres-



ent conditions are perhaps not very propitious for the undertaking of such an enterprise, scientific development gives important impulses. I have to mention first of all, action theory and game theory which promise to outline a structure, not static or linear as the structuralists have been thinking, but dynamic and dialectical, consisting in the strategic moves of opponent agents. Action theory and game theory have a deep influence on linguistics today and there are even some experiments on narrative topics as well. However, in this field, a rather old work remains the most instructive - Aristotle's Poetics.

Thus arriving at the starting point of my exposition, I put an end to my introductory remarks. If the listener is a bit disappointed that here I have raised so many questions without giving detailed answers, he should be reminded that nothing other could be my aim but to put the questions and to formulate them in a provocative way. The questions will be answered by our participants who are all distinguished specialists in their fields and should the listener be dissatisfied with one answer or another, he is kindly requested to look for an adequate solution and to work with us in the discussion.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> cf. Searle, J.R.: The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse, New Literary History 6/1975, pp. 319-332.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle: Poetics VI. 50a6. The English text follows - in this case not literally - G.E. Else's translation in: G.E. Else: Aristotle's Poetics The Argument. Leiden 1957. p. 238.

- <sup>3</sup> *ibid.* IX. 51 b30-32. resp.p. 315.
- <sup>4</sup> Russell, B.: *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London 1967<sup>12</sup>, p. 168.
- <sup>4a</sup> Reichenbach, H.: *Elements of Symbolic Logic*, New York - London 1966<sup>10</sup>
- <sup>5</sup> cf. Frege, G.: *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*, in: Frege G.: *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung, Fünf logische Studien*. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von G. Patzig, Göttingen 1975<sup>4</sup>, pp. 40-65., Frege, G.: *Schriften zur Logik*. Aus dem Nachlass, Berlin 1973, Strawson, P.F.: *On Referring*, *Mind* 235/1950, pp. 320-344. Strawson, P.F.: *Introduction to Logical Theory*, London 1967<sup>5</sup>, Ryle, G.: *Imaginary Objects* *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary vol. 12. (*Creativity, Politics and the A Priori*), 1933. pp. 18-43., Moore, G.E.: *Imaginary Objects*, *ibid.* pp. 55-70., Ingarden, R.: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, Tübingen 1965<sup>3</sup>.
- <sup>6</sup> Woods, J.: *The Logic of Fiction*, The Hague 1974.
- <sup>7</sup> Castañeda, H.N.: *Fiction and Reality: their Fundamental Connections*, *Poetics* 1-2/1979, pp. 31-62.
- <sup>8</sup> Routley, R.: *The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse*, *Poetics* 1-2/1979, pp. 3-30, the quoted passage pp. 10-11.
- <sup>9</sup> Aristotle's *Poetics* IX. 51 b11. op. cit. p. 302.

- 10 Bierwisch, M.: On Classifying Semantic Features, in:  
Steinberg, D.D. - Jakobovits, L.A.: (eds.):  
Semantics. An Interdisciplinary Reader in Phil-  
osophy Linguistics and Psychology, Cambridge  
1971, pp. 410-435. The quoted passage p. 416.
- 11 Lang, E.: Semantik der koordinativen Verknüpfung. *Studia  
grammatica* XIV. Berlin 1977.
- 12 cf. Kanyó, Z.: Kriterien der Fortsetzbarkeit in monolo-  
gischen konjunktiv verbundenen Ketten (Darge-  
stellt an Hand von Strittmatters Kalenderge-  
schichte "Der Spuk"), in: Dañes, F. - Viehweger,  
D. (eds.): Probleme der Textgrammatik II.  
*Studia grammatica* XVIII., Berlin 1977, pp. 33-72.
- 13 Bierwisch, M.: op. cit. p. 416.